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ABSTRACT: Alert correlation is a process that analyses the alerts produced 
by one or more diverse devices and provides a more succinct and high-level 
view of occurring or attempted intrusions. The objective of this study is to 
analyse the current alert correlation technique and identify the significant 
criteria in each technique that can improve the Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) problem such as prone to alert flooding, contextual problem, false 
alert and scalability. The existing alert correlation techniques had been 
reviewed and analysed. From the analysis, six capability criteria have been 
identified to improve the current alert correlation techniques which are 
capability to do alert reduction, alert clustering, identify multi-step attack, 
reduce false alert, detect known attack and detect unknown attack and 
technique’s combination is proposed.
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1.0 Introduction
Computer security offers three types of security mechanism to protect a 
system which are authentication, authorisation and auditing for securing the 
systems against attack.  In order to provide extra layers of defence in case of 
these mechanisms are flaws, IDS have been proposed.  Intrusion detection 
technology has gained increasing acceptance in enterprise networks, with 
both commercially supported and open source components widely deployed 
(Anderson, Fong, & Valdes, 2002).  However, it has few weaknesses such as 
prone to alert flooding, contextual problem due to attacks are likely to generate 
multiple related alert, false alert and scalability (Debar & Wespi, 2001) and 
correlation is proposed to overcome these weaknesses.  
Devices and sensor diversity has resulted in a new difficulty in generating 
reports due to the unmanageable amount of alert.  Referring to Figure 1, in 
view of domain perspective various log resources can be gained from host; 
network, application, sensor and wireless.  It can be argued that diverse 
intrusion detection sensor and diverse devices log resources provide more 
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complete coverage of the attack space. However, the potential added leverage 
from devices diversity is not clear that require the security administrator’s 
decision on which reports pertains to the same or to different incidents. This 
issue has motivated the researcher to do research on correlation of alert produce 
by intrusion detection sensor and diverse log resources. 
 
Diverse log 
resources Host log 
Network log 
Application log 
Wireless log 
Sensor alert log 
Figure 1: Domain perspective of diverse log resources
2.0 Intrusion Alert Correlation
Alert can be produced from various types of sources and it may cause multiple 
stages of attack.   Alert correlation is multi-step processes that receives alerts 
from one or more IDS as input and produce a high-level description of the 
malicious activity on the network.  According to (Hattala, Sars, Addams, & 
Virtanen, 2004), to achieve good recognition, the data needs to be collected 
from various sources (for example firewall, web server logs, IDS of multiple 
manufacturers and so on).  Correlation of alerts produced by diverse log 
resources can provide a number of potential advantages and the most obvious 
benefit is the reduction in the number of alerts that a security officer must 
address. 
When considering single log resource, a correlation engine can reduce alert 
volume by organizing numerous alerts that are part of an ongoing attack, 
namely known as alert threading. In the case of diverse log resources, a 
correlation engine should recognize when reports from multiple log resources 
refer to the same incident. Correlation is the degree to which one or more 
attributes or measurements on the same group of elements show a tendency 
to vary together.  Correlation can enhance detection capability, and give a 
more complete picture of attacks that an individual sensor or devices may 
observe only partially without losing the security-relevant information. In 
addition, correlation can exploit the complementary coverage from several log 
resources. Reports from several log resources employing diverse analytical 
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techniques may reinforce each other and therefore enhance the confidence of 
the detection.  
3.0 Related Works on Current Alert Correlation Technique
There are four techniques exist in correlating alerts which are Similarity-based, 
Pre-defined attack scenarios and Pre-requisites and consequences of individual 
attack and Statistical causal analysis (refer to Figure 2).
 SIMILARITY-BASED 
PRE-DEFINED ATTACK SCENARIOS 
PRE-REQUISITES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL ATTACK 
STATISTICAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
ALERT 
CORRELATION 
TECHNIQUE 
Figure 2:  Classification of Alert Correlation Technique
3.1 Similarity-Based
Similarity-based technique will compare an alert to all alert threads that have 
similar attributes or features (e.g source IP address, destination IP address, 
ports) and then correlates alerts with a high degree of feature similarity if 
match or a new thread is created if none is match (Valdes & Skinner, 2001). 
(Valdes & Skinner, 2001) has implemented alert similarity metric using 
Emerald in three phases as in Figure 3.  In the first phase, the low-level events 
is aggregated using the attack threads concepts to cluster alert that are part of 
the same ongoing attack.  The alerts are clustered if attribute is overlap which 
mean that it will only consider attributes that present in both alerts. 
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PHASE 1:  Alert 
clustered if 
attribute overlap 
Similarity-
based 
Technique 
PHASE 2:  similar 
sensor field is 
dropped, similar alert 
name is maintained 
PHASE 3:  similar 
attack class in both 
alert and threshold 
is set. 
PURPOSE:  
To cluster alert 
that are part of 
same ongoing 
attack 
PURPOSE:  
To ensure the 
detection of 
same attack by 
multiple 
sensors is 
fused 
PURPOSE:  To 
merge alerts 
for higher-level 
view of attack. 
Figure 3: Similarity-based intrusion alert correlation process by Valdes & Skinner.
The metric for this phase demand that sensor field, attack class, attack name, 
source and target in both alerts are similar.  In second phase, different levels 
of similarity are expected for different attributes in different situation whereby 
similar sensor field is dropped and similar alert name is maintained. This 
phase is to ensure that detection of the same attack by multiple sensors should 
be fused.  Then in third phase,  it requires similar attack class in both alert. 
Certain threshold is adjust for example for synthetic threads, sensor id and IP 
is set high and for multistep attack detection, threshold for attack class is set to 
low. This phase will merge alerts representing different attack steps to provide 
a higher-level view of the security state of the system.
3.2	 Pre-Defined	Attack	Scenarios
This technique utilizes the fact that intrusions often require several actions 
to take place in order to succeed.  Every attack scenario has corresponding 
steps required for the successfulness of the attack.  Low- level alerts from 
IDS are compared against the pre-defined attack scenario before the alerts can 
be correlated. It is restricted to known attack and misuse detection only and 
specified by human users or learned through training datasets.  The example of 
implementation is ASL (Attack Specification Language).
(Debar & Wespi, 2001) has presented a detailed semantic alert model and 
developed adapter modules to map proprietary alert formats into this model. 
This alert model was further refined and is now the de-facto format for intrusion 
detection alerts known as Intrusion Detection Exchange Format (IDMEF). 
They have proposed a system that performs correlation and aggregation 
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of intrusion detection alerts produced by various sensor as in Figure 4.  In 
correlation phase, there are two types of correlation which are duplicate 
removal and consequence correlation. 
 Matching pre-defined 
attack scenarios 
CORRELATION (Group 
alerts that are part of the 
same attack trend) 
AGGREGATION (cluster 
alert with similar 
attributes-source, target, 
attack class) 
DUPLICATE 
REMOVAL 
CONSEQUENCE 
CORRELATION 
Figure 4:  Pre-defined attack scenarios intrusion alert correlation process  
by Debar & Wespi.
Duplicates are instances of the same attack as detected using rules read from 
a specified configuration file by two different sensor.  Consequences are rules 
that specify one event should be followed by another type of event.  It will 
link together alerts that are sequential in nature.  Once alerts has correlated, 
aggregation phase will cluster alerts with similar attributes (source, target and 
attack class).  It identifies the source of the attack, the target of the attack 
and popular attack class.  It will group alerts based on certain criteria to 
aggregate severity level, reveal trends and clarify attacker’s intentions.  This 
phase consists of large number of false positive, however there is no specific 
technique can eliminate this problem.  Major weakness of this method are, it 
requires that human users specify attack scenarios and it is limited to detection 
of known attacks.
3.3 Pre-Requisites and Consequences of individual attacks
This technique work at a higher level than correlation based on attributes 
similarities, but a lower level then correlation based on known scenarios.  Pre-
conditions are defined as the necessary conditions that must exist for the attack 
to be successful, and the consequences for the attack are defined as conditions 
that may exist after a specific attack has occurred.  It is represented as a logical 
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formula using AND and OR connectives.  This technique is not restricted to 
known attack scenarios and its uncover the causal relationship between alerts. 
Most of the approaches using this method are focused on the modeling and 
detection of multistep attacks to provide a high-level of the attack associated 
with a security compromise.
 Alert Base 
Management 
 
IDS 
IDS 
IDS 
Alert 
Clustering 
Alert 
Merging 
Alert 
Correlation 
Intention 
Recognition 
Reaction 
Alert 
Dbase 
Figure 5:  Pre-requisite and Consequences of individual attack intrusion alert 
correlation process by Cuppens & Miege.
By using these technique as depicted in Figure 5, (Cuppens & Miege, 2002) 
has include five functions including alert base management, alert clustering, 
alert merging, alert correlation and intention recognition function.  In alert 
base management function, it receives alerts generated by IDS and stores them 
for further analysis by cooperation module.  This alert will be normalized to 
IDMEF format and store in the relational database.  Alert cluster and alert 
merging function can access the database and will use the similarity function 
to cluster and merge the alert.  Alert correlation function will further analyzes 
the cluster alerts provided by alert merging function using explicit correlation 
rules with pre-defined and consequence statement.  This approach attempt 
to generate correlation rules automatically which can introduce correlated 
alerts that are similar by chance and this could increase the noise in the alert 
stream. 
(Ning, Cui, & Reeves, Analyzing Intensive Intrusion Alerts via Correlation, 
2002), (Ning, Cui, & Reeves, Constructing Attack Scenarios through 
Correlation of Intrusion Alerts, 2002) has implemented causal relationships 
between alerts using pre-requisite and consequences .  Hyper-alerts connected 
graph are created and graph-manipulation techniques are applied to reduce 
these connected alerts into manageable alert.  This approach can correlate 
alerts in the middle of attack chain even if the start of the chain is missed. 
This can be useful in the case of intruder can pass through the access-list of 
router unnoticable and easily attack the server in the LAN.  It can correlate 
the second and third attack even if the pre-conditions of the second alert were 
not met.  This system can generate graph which is useful in determining the 
attacker’s objective.
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3.4 Statistical Causal Analysis
This technique by (Qin & Le, 2003) as shown in Figure 6, implements anomaly 
detection and use Granger Causality Test (time series analysis method) to 
correlate events which emphasis on attack scenario analysis.  In order to 
reduce the volume of raw alerts, it will combine low-level alert based on alert 
attributes.  It uses clustering technique to process low-level alert-data into 
high-level aggregated alerts.  Prioritization alerts is used based on relevance of 
attacks and impacts on the mission goal.  It will then conduct causality analysis 
to correlate alerts and constructs attack scenario.  It is pure statistical causality 
analysis and does not need pre-defined knowledge about attack scenarios. 
Hence, new attack scenarios can be identified.  
 
Alert 
Aggregation 
Alert Fusion Alert Clustering      
(to generate 
hyper alert) 
Alert Prioritization 
Alert Correlation 
IDS 
Conduct causality 
analysis 
Construct Attack 
Scenario 
IDS 
IDS 
Figure 6: Statistical Causality Analysis alert correlation process by Qin & Le
This technique declares that every multi-step attack will generate alert that 
have statistical similarities in their attributes, and this attack steps have causal 
relationship.  (Qin & Le, 2003) run the statistical correlation engine offline 
with training datasets to compute and store correlations so that it can be used 
for pattern matching at run-time.  This technique is not a feasible solution for 
the complete correlation process.  However it can be utilized as a part of a 
larger system to pre-process alerts or to provide meta-alert signatures.
4.0 Review and Analysis of Alert Correlation Technique
4.1 Alert Correlation Techniques Comparison
The researchers have reviewed the advantages and disadvantageous of these 
four techniques to enable it to be further analysed to produce the capability 
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criteria as stated in section 4.2.  In similarity-based, the advantage of this 
technique is that it has the capability to reduce large number of redundant alert 
generated by multiple sensors.  However, this technique is not able to detect 
false alert if others sensors cannot detect the same attack simultaneously.  Due 
to this disadvantageous this technique is not capable to detect multi-step attack. 
Moreover, it can only detect misuse detection and not anomaly-detection.
In Pre-defined attack scenarios, it has similar advantage to similarity-based 
technique.  In addition, it can cluster multiple related alerts and detect precise 
attack as stated in the rules. However, according to (Valeur, 2006) it could 
generate large number of false positive alarm and it requires that users specify 
attack scenarios manually.  Furthermore, it is limited to detection of known 
attacks or misuse detection and multi-step attack alert is disregarded.
For Pre-requisites and consequences of individual attack, the good news is 
that multi-step attack can be detected to provide a high-level view of the attack 
associated with a security compromise and generate useful graph to determine 
the attacker’s objective (Ning, Cui, & Reeves, Analyzing Intensive Intrusion 
Alerts via Correlation, 2002).  Nevertheless, according to (Cuppens & Miege, 
2002), automatic generation correlation rules can generate large false alarm. 
Statistical Causality Analysis has the advantage of not needed pre-defined 
knowledge about attack scenarios as this technique use anomaly-based for 
detection so that new attack scenarios can be identified.  This technique is ideal 
to be used as pre-process alerts or meta-alert signatures.  Even so, according 
to (Hattala, Sars, Addams, & Virtanen, 2004), this technique is not feasible for 
complete correlation process 
4.2 Proposed Criteria for Alert Correlation Technique  
Four important intrusion alert correlation techniques has been reviewed and 
analysed.  The objective of this study is to analyse the current alert correlation 
technique and identify the significant criteria within each technique which can 
improve the IDS problem.  As mentioned by (Debar & Wespi, 2001), IDS 
has developed issues on alert flooding, contextual problem, false alert and 
scalability.  The characteristic that shall be analysed in each alert correlation 
technique is according to the issue listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Issue analysed in IDS 
No IDS Issue Description Propose Solution
1 Alert flooding IDS are prone to alert 
flooding as they provide a 
large number of alerts to 
the security officer, who 
then has the difficulties 
coping with the load.
1.  To reduce number of 
alert generated from 
IDS.
2 Contextual 
problem
Attacks are likely to 
generate multiple related 
alerts.  Current IDS 
do not make it easy 
for security officers to 
logically group related 
alerts.
1.  To group or cluster 
alert which has a 
related event or event 
threaded.
2.  To identify multi-step 
attack
3 False Alert Existing IDS are likely to 
generate false positives 
or false negatives alerts
1.  To reduce number of 
false alerts
2.  To identify known 
attack using misuse 
detection
3.  To identify unknown 
attack using anomaly 
detection
Based on the IDS current issues, most of the current alert correlation techniques 
were developed in order to improve this problem.  Therefore the proposed 
criterion that shall be analysed is according to the capability criteria as listed 
below:
1. Capability to do alert reduction
2. Capability to do alert clustering 
3. Capability to identify multi-step attack.
4. Capability to reduce false alert.
5. Capability to detect known attack
6. Capability to detect unknown attack
Alert reduction is required in order to overcome the problem of alert flooding 
or large amount of alert data generated by the IDS.  This capability criterion 
is important in order to reduce the security officer’s tension in performing 
troubleshooting when analysing the exact attacker in their environment.  For 
second criteria, alert clustering is considered as important as it can cluster 
multiple related alerts and at the same time reduce the number of alert by 
ignoring the similar alert generated by different sensors or diverse log resources. 
The third criteria, most of the alert correlation technique is incapable to detect 
multi-step attack.  Therefore this capability is required as attacker behaviour 
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is becoming more sophisticated and it shall involve one to many, many to 
one and many to many attacks.  For fourth criteria, most of the IDS have 
the tendency to produce false alarm.  This false alarm reduction criterion 
is important as it closely related to alert flooding issue.  The fifth and sixth 
criterion, the capability to detect both known and unknown attack is required 
to ensure that the alert generated will overcome the issue of alert flooding and 
false alert.  Table 2, is the summary of analysis from each alert correlation 
techniques match with the proposed capability criteria.
Table 2: Alert correlation technique versus proposed capability criteria
(capable=√, incapable=×)
Based on the analysis, all of the techniques have the same capability to reduce 
and cluster the alert, and detect known attack except for pre-requisite and 
consequences of individual attack and statistical causality technique.  The 
additional capability of pre-requisite and consequences of individual attack is 
to identify multi-step attack whereas the unknown attack can be detected using 
statistical causality technique.  None of the technique is best for detecting 
malware and the researcher proposed that a combination of Pre-requisites 
and consequences of individual attack with Statistical causality will at least 
overcome the problem in detecting unknown attack and multi-step attack but 
still the false alert problem are still exist.  This has given an implication that 
there is a room for improvement for each of the technique in detecting known 
and unknown attack, and multi-step attack as these capability criteria shall 
overcome large number of false alert problem.  
5.0 Conclusion and Future Works 
In this study, researcher have reviewed and analysed the existing alert 
correlation technique to overcome the IDS’s problems discussed.  From the 
analysis researcher propose an improved solution for alert correlation technique 
based on six capability criteria identified which are capability to do alert 
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reduction, capability to do alert clustering, capability to identify multi-step 
attack, capability to reduce false alert, capability to detect known attack and 
capability to detect unknown attack.   According to the capability criteria, none 
of the correlation techniques can stand on its own in detecting the malware 
intrusion. Further improvement should be done on the process of detecting 
the known and unknown attack, and multi-step attack as these capability 
criteria shall overcome large number of false alert problem.  Therefore further 
research on intrusion alert correlation technique with these capabilities to 
detect unknown attack using combination of anomaly and misuse detection 
approach is required.  
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